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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Victor Luis Hernandez appeals from his judgment and sentence entered upon his
conviction for rape.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
Hernandez was charged with rape for an act that he committed against his
estranged (now former) wife, Maria Zuniga.

(R., pp. 7-8.)

He pied not guilty to the

charge and the case was set for trial. (R., pp. 22-23.)
At trial, Ms. Zuniga testified. (Tr., p. 92, L. 20 - p. 244, L. 23.) She explained
that their four-year-old son had been hospitalized because he was very sick. (Tr., p.
108, L. 23 - p. 110, L. 15.) She explained that the night of the rape, she had taken a
break from the hospital and visited Herminia Sandoval, her new boyfriend, at her home.
(Tr., p. 115, L. 20 - 116, L. 6.) When she returned to the hospital, Hernandez was
there. (Tr., p. 116, Ls. 7-9.) Hernandez criticized her for leaving her son in the hospital
while she went to visit Herminia. (Tr., p. 122, Ls. 10-18.) Ms. Zuniga explained that
Hernandez became very upset and demanding. (Tr., p. 123, Ls. 21-22.) She testified:
"He started to approach me now with questions about leaving my son alone, I'd rather
be with someone else than to be there with my son." (Tr., p. 123, Ls. 16-20.) She
explained that she turned around to wash her face and Hernandez continued to berate
her, saying "you'd rather be with someone else, you are seeing someone else." (Tr., p.
126, Ls. 5-15.)

He then grabbed her by the shoulders.

(Tr., p. 126, Ls. 16-23.) He

pushed her into the bathroom in the hospital room and told her that he could have
whatever he wanted, whenever he wanted it. (Tr., p. 131, L. 2- p. 134, L. 14.) Ms.
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Zuniga testified that Herminia then pulled down her pants and raped her. (Tr., p. 134, L.
15 - p. 138, L. 10.) Ms. Zuniga testified that after he finished he kept reminding her
"that [their other children] are with his mom, how if I tell anybody - if you just tell
anybody just what happened, just remember the girls are with my side of the family."
(Tr., p., 142, Ls. 7-11.) He told her, "[NJow Herminia ... now he is going to know what it
is to have his girlfriend fucked by someone else." (Tr., p. 142, Ls. 17-20.)
During Ms. Zuniga's testimony, the prosecutor attempted to elicit information that,
shortly after the rape, Hernandez made a telephone call to a friend. (Tr., p. 148, L. 19 p. 150, L. 6.) Hernandez objected to this testimony and, outside of the presence of the
jury, Ms. Zuniga testified that she overheard Hernandez tell his friend "they are going to
go get some weapons to go visit Herminia [Ms. Zuniga's current boyfriend]." (Tr., p.
151, L. 20 - p. 152, L. 18.) Hernandez objected to this statement on I.R.E. 402 and
I.R.E. 403 grounds. (Tr., p. 153, L. 3 - p. 154, L. 18.) In overruling his objection, the
district court held:
Number one, I think it is relevant to a number of things, not just going to
her state of mind and why she took the action she took. But it appears to
me given the State's theory of the assault and the purpose behind the
assault that it is part of the entire assault. It's just a continuation of what is
going on.
FurthenT1ore undei 403 - and I do recognize it is an exercise cf
discretion - I do not believe its probative value is unduly - is so prejudicial
that it outweighs the relevance of what was occurring.
1

(Tr., p. 155, Ls. 7-20.) Ms. Zuniga thereafter testified about the conversation to the jury.
(Tr., p. 156, L. 15 - p. 157, L. 1.)

Immediately after Ms. Zuniga testified about the

telephone conversation, the district court gave a limiting instruction, advising the jury
that the "statement is not being offered for the truth of any matter asserted in the
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statement. It is merely being offered for the purpose of showing [Ms. Zuniga's] state of
mind." (Tr., p. 157, Ls. 2-6.)
The jury found Hernandez guilty of rape.

(R., pp. 149.)

Hernandez was

sentenced to 1O years with two years fixed and the district court retained jurisdiction.
(R., pp. 162-165.)

After Hernandez performed poorly on his rider, the district court

relinquished jurisdiction and ordered his sentence executed.
Hernandez timely appealed. (R., pp. 177-79.)

3

(R., pp. 171-73.)

ISSUES
Hernandez states the issues on appeal as follows:
1.
Did the district court commit reversible error by admitting
testimony regarding unrelated bad acts of Mr. Hernandez, in violation of
Rules 401, 402, 403, and 404 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence?
2.
Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing a
unified sentence of ten years with two years fixed, upon Mr. Hernandez's
conviction for rape, in light of the mitigating factors present in his case?
(Appellant's brief, p. 4.)
The state rephrases the issues as follows:
1.
Has Hernandez failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in
admitting the testimony that Hernandez told a friend to "get the weapons. We are going
to visit Herminia"?
2.
Has Hernandez failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing
discretion?

4

ARGUMENT
I.
Hernandez Has Shown No Error In Admittance Of The Testimony

A

Introduction
Hernandez asserts that the district court abused its discretion in admitting

testimony that, while talking on the telephone after raping Ms. Zuniga, he told a friend
"to get the weapons ready, we are going to visit Herminio." (Appellant's brief, p. 5.) He
asserts that admission of this testimony violated Idaho Rules of Evidence 401, 402, 403,
and 404. (Appellant's brief, p. 8.) Hernandez's argument is without merit. As an initial
matter, Hernandez failed to object on I.RE. 404(b) grounds below, and the issue is not
preserved for appeal on this ground. Further, the evidence was relevant to explain Ms.
Zuniga's delay in reporting the rape and directly addressed the state's theory of the
case. Further, the probative value of the testimony was not substantially outweighed by
unfair prejudice.

Hernandez has failed to show that the district court abused its

discretion in admitting this evidence.

B.

Standard Of Review
Relevance of evidence is reviewed de novo. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 264,

923 P.2d 966, 971 (1996); State v. Lamphere, 130 Idaho 630, 632, 945 P.2d 1, 3

(1997); State v. MacDonald, 131 Idaho 367, 956 P.2d 1314 (Ct. App. 1998). Whether
the probative value of relevant evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice is a discretionary matter that will be disturbed only if the appellant
demonstrates that the district court abused its discretion. State v. Enno, 119 Idaho 392,
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406, 807 P.2d 610 (1991); State v. Birkla, 126 Idaho 498, 500, 887 P.2d 43 (Ct. App.
1994).

C.

The District Court Properly Admitted The Testimony
1.

Hernandez Has Failed To Preserve His I.R.E. 404(b) Claim For Appeal

Hernandez asserts that the district court abused its discretion in admitting
testimony that, while talking on the telephone after raping Ms. Zuniga, he told a friend
"to get the weapons ready, we are going to visit Herminia." On appeal, he asserts that
this testimony was admitted, in part, in contravention of I.R.E. 404(b). (Appellant's brief,
pp. 8-13.) However, Hernandez failed to object on I.R.E. 404(b) grounds below. He
objected to the evidence on I.R.E. 402 relevancy grounds (Tr., p. 153, Ls. 3-6), and on
I.RE. 403 grounds, asserting that the evidence was more prejudicial than probative (Tr.,
p. 154, Ls. 11-18). Thus, the I.RE. 404(b) issue raised on appeal is not properly before
this court.
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely objection must
be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal." State v. Carlson,
134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). Whether the issue was preserved is
a "threshold" inquiry. State v. Stevens, 115 Idaho 457, 459, 767 P.2d 832, 834 (Ct.
App. 1989). Absent a timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only review
an alleged error under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,
_ , 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010). Review under the fundamental error doctrine requires
Hernandez to demonstrate the error he alleges: "(1) violates one or more of [his]
unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional
information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether
6

the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless." State v. Perry,
150 Idaho 209, _ , 245 P.3d 961, 980 (2010). Herndandez has not argued, much less
demonstrated, fundamental error. Nor can he. The allegedly erroneous admission of
I.R.E. 404(b) evidence, however, "is a trial error and does not go to the foundation of the
case or take from the defendant a right which was essential to his defense." State v.
Cannady, 137 Idaho 67, 72-73, 44 P.3d 1122, 1127-28 (2002) (citing State v. Johnson,
126 Idaho 892, 894 P.2d 125 (1995); State v. Bingham, 116 Idaho 415, 776 P.2d 424
(1989)); See also State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010) (fundamental
error standard applicable only to constitutional error.). Thus, Hernandez cannot show
fundamental error in the admittance of the testimony on I.R.E. 404(b) grounds.

2.

Hernandez Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Admitting
The Evidence Under Either I.R.E. 402 or I.R.E. 403

To be admissible, evidence must be relevant. I.R.E. 401, 402. Evidence is
relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence
to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence." I.R.E. 401; State v. Hocker, 115 Idaho 544, 768 P.2d 807 (Ct.
App. 1989).

Here, the testimony was undoubtedly relevant.

The evidence of what

Hernandez said shortly after raping Zuniga does not go to his propensity to commit bad
acts, as Hernandez asserts on appeal (Appellant's brief, p. 9-11) but rather it was
admissible to show the effect that overhearing that telephone conversation had on Ms.
Zuniga.

At triai, Zuniga's credibiiity was directly at issue:

oniy two individuals knew

what occurred that evening - Ms. Zuniga and Hernandez - and Hernandez's trial
strategy was to discredit Ms. Zuniga by, in part, focusing on Ms. Zuniga's delay in
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reporting the rape.

(Tr., p. 39, L. 25 - p. 40, L. 9.)

The testimony also directly

supported the state's theory of the case - that the rape was an attack against both Ms.
Zuniga and her new boyfriend, Herminia. (Tr., p. 19, L. 9 - p. 21, L. 6.)
"Whether a fact is material is determined by its relationship to the legal theories
presented by the parties." State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 671, 227 P.3d 918, 925
(2010) (citing State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 143, 191 P.3d 217, 221 (2008)). This
evidence was directly relevant the state's theory of the case. The state explained its
theory in closing arguments:
[Hernandez] raped the mother of his children because he could.
He raped her to humiliate her. He raped her because he was angry and
he was frustrated with her because she had moved on.
And he decided that he could do whatever he wanted and that he
would humiliate her and he would take something from her, as Maria told
you herself, so that he could take something from her one last time, so
that Maria's new boyfriend, the person who she has now been with for two
years, would know what it felt like to have somebody else, in his words,
fuck his girlfriend. That's why he did it. That is why Victor Hernandez
committed the crime of rape.
(Tr., p. 479, L. 25 - p. 480, L. 14.) The evidence that, shortly after raping Ms. Zuniga,
Hernandez called a friend and told him "to get the weapons ready, we are going to visit
Herminia" is relevant to show why Hernandez raped Ms. Zuniga - that it was not just an
attack on Ms. Zuniga but, as the district court noted at sentencing, "a sort of a mu!tiattack thing" on both Ms. Zuniga and Herminia. (Tr., p. 566, Ls. 4-8.)
Further, Ms. Zuniga's credibility was directly at issue and this evidence is
relevant to explain her delay in reporting the rape. State v. Diggs, 141 Idaho 303, 108
P.3d 1003 (Ct. App. 2005), is instructive. Diggs was charged with three counts of lewd
conduct with a minor under sixteen. Qlgg_§, 141 Idaho at 304, 108 P. 3d at 1004. At
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trial, the prosecutor asked the victim why he finally disclosed the abuse to his mother
and the victim replied, "because he tried it on [my younger brother}."

lg__,_ The defense

moved for a mistrial, which was denied. lg__,_ at 305, 108 P.3d at 1005.

Immediately

following the testimony, the district court gave a limiting instruction directing the jury to
not consider the testimony for any purpose other than as it related to the reason and
timing of the victim's disclosure. lg__,_ On appeal, Diggs asserted that the district court
erred because the testimony was not relevant to any material issue in the trial. Id. The
Court of Appeals disagreed and explained:
As the district court explained, even without a direct challenge to the
victim's credibility based on the delay in reporting, a jury may consider the
absence of a prompt report of the crime as a factor that makes the victim
less credible, and the jury may be left to speculate about the reason for
the ultimate revelation.
An explanation for why an alleged victim
eventually chose to report the abuse can aid the fact finder in determining
whether the victim is credible or whether the victim's testimony might have
been conjured up to harm the defendant or fabricated for some other
improper purpose.
Diggs, 141 Idaho at 306, 108 P.3d at 1006.
Likewise, here, the evidence offered an explanation for why Ms. Zuniga did not
immediately disclose the rape.

The evidence helps "aid the uury] in determining

whether [Ms. Zuniga] is credible or whether [Ms. Zuniga's] testimony might have been
conjured up to harm the defendant or fabricated for some other improper purpose."

~

Hernandez also asserts that the probative value of the testimony was
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 11-

13.) Again, State v. Diggs is instructive. in Qigg_§, the Court of Appeals also found that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the probative value of the
evidence against any unfair prejudice. 141 Idaho at 306, 108 P.3d at 1006. It noted
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that the state's case rested entirely upon whether the jury found the victim to be
credible.

!st That the victim provided an explanation for why he eventually chose to

disclose the abuse was "likely an important component of his credibility in the eyes of
the jury."

!st The sole evidence of the incident consisted of the victim's response. Id.

The Court of Appeals noted:
The district court specifically ordered that no more inquiry be made
into the incident with [the brother]. The purpose of that restriction was to
minimize any prejudice to Diggs because further inquiry into the [brother]
incident could have magnified its importance in the minds of the jurors.
The district court also gave a limiting instruction to the jury concerning the
use of this evidence.
Id. The Court of Appeals concluded, "the district court acted within the bounds of its
discretion when it determined that the probative value of the testimony was not
substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice."

!st

Likewise, here, the probative value of the evidence was not substantially
outweighed by unfair prejudice. An explanation for Ms. Zuniga's delay in reporting was
"likely an important component of [her] credibility in the eyes of the jury."

!st Like in

Diggs, any possible prejudice to Hernandez was minimized when the prosecutor did not
ask Ms. Zuniga any follow up questions about the threat or about any other on-going
Tr., p. 441, L. 10 - p. 448, L. 25.) And,

threats between Herminio and Hernandez.

like in .Qlgg_§, a limiting instruction was given immediately following introduction of the
statement. (Tr., p. 157, Ls. 2-6.) The district court stated: "Ladies and gentlemen, this
statement is not being offered for the truth of any matter asserted in the statement It is
merely being offered for the purpose of showing her state of mind." (Tr., p. 157, Ls. 26.) Presuming as this Court must that the jury followed the court's instructions, State v.
Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 601, 768 P.2d 1331, 1334 (1989); State v. Hudson, 129 Idaho
10

478, 927 P.2d 451 (Ct. App.1996), there is no risk that the jury would have convicted
Hernandez of rape simply because he had threatened to harm Ms. Zuniga's boyfriend
during a telephone conversation, much less a risk sufficient to substantially outweigh
the probative value of the evidence. See State v. Scovell, 136 Idaho 587, 591, 38 P.3d
625, 629 (Ct. App. 2001) (noting the risk of unfair prejudice relating to the admission of
uncharged misconduct was reduced by "the trial court's instruction that the jurors were
not to consider the uncharged acts as proof that Scovell had criminal propensities or
behaved in conformity with them by committing the charged crimes").
The disputed evidence at trial consisted of single comment by Ms. Zuniga that
she heard Hernandez tell a friend on the telephone "to get the weapons ready, we are
going to visit Herminia." Indeed, if the jury found Ms. Zuniga credible there was little to
no risk that it convicted Hernandez merely because he was a man of criminal character.
Because the evidence in question came primarily or exclusively from the same witness,
Ms. Zuniga, there was no actual risk that the jury concluded that she was credible
merely because Hernandez was of the character to have done what Ms. Zuniga testified
he did.

Hernandez has failed to show an abuse of the district court's discretion in

admitting this evidence.

3.

Even If Admission Of The Testimony Was Error, The Error Was Harmless

"If irrelevant evidence is admitted, then the focus on appeal should be whether or
not such error prejudiced the objecting party." White v. Mock, 140 Idaho 882,891, 104
P.3d 356, 365 (2004) (citing State v. Cannady, 137 Idaho 67, 70, 44 P.3d 1122, 1125
(2002)). See also I.RE. 103(a) ("Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which
admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected .... ");
11

I.C.R. 52 ("Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial
rights shall be disregarded."). Where evidence is erroneously admitted, the test is
'"whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have
contributed to the conviction and that the court must be able to declare a belief that it
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."' State v. Jones, 125 Idaho 477, 488, 873
P.2d 122,133 (1994) (quoting State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742,762,810 P.2d 680,700
(1991 )); see also State v. Zimmerman, 121 Idaho 971, 976, 829 P.2d 861, 865 (1992)
(to hold erroneous admission of evidence harmless, court must '"declare a belief,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no reasonable possibility that [the] evidence
complained of contributed to the conviction'") (brackets original) (quoting State v. Sharp,
101 Idaho 498, 507, 616 P.2d 1034, 1043 (1980)).

The State has the burden of

demonstrating that an objected-to, non-constitutionally-based error is harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, _, 245 P.3d 961,974 (2010).
It is highly unlikely the jury convicted Herndandez simply based upon Ms.
Zuniga's testimony that he threatened her boyfriend, as opposed to the detailed and
uncontradicted testimony concerning his rape of Ms. Zuniga. Hernandez did not testify.
His defense was based on undermining the credibility of Zuniga. He argued that the
victim fabricated the allegations because of a child custody/divorce dispute and that the
sexual contact was consensual. (Tr., p. 514, L. 21 - p. 516, L. 2; p. 533, Ls. 18-24.) As
explained above, the testimony was admissible. To the extent that this Court deems it
inadmissible, such error was harmless.

12

11.
Hernandez Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing
Discretion
A.

Introduction
Hernandez asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed a

unified sentence of 10 years, with 2 years fixed. (Appellant's brief, p. 13.) Hernandez,
however, has failed to show any abuse of sentencing discretion.

B.

Standard of Review
When a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellate court will review only for

an abuse of discretion. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007).
The appellant has the burden of demonstrating that the sentencing court abused its
discretion.

C.

lit

Hernandez Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing
Discretion
Hernandez was convicted by a jury of rape and received a sentence of 10 years

with two years fixed.

(R., pp. 162-65.) The district court retained jurisdiction.

(Id.)

After Hernandez performed poorly on his rider, the district court relinquished jurisdiction
and ordered his sentence executed. 1 (R, pp. 171-73.) Hernandez asserts that, "given
any view of the facts, his unified sentence of ten years, with two years fixed, is
excessive." (Appellant's brief, p. 13.) Hernandez's argument fails.
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant must
establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive.
Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401. To establish that the sentence was
1

The Addendum to the PSI is not included in the record on appeal.
13

excessive, he must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not conclude the
sentence was appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society,
deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution.

&

Hernandez has failed to demonstrate that the sentence he received was an
abuse of discretion. A sentence of confinement is reasonable if "it appears necessary
to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the
related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution." State v. Dushkin, 124 Idaho
184, 185, 857 P.2d 663, 664 (Ct. App. 1993).
sentencing goals, or weigh each one equally.

A sentence need not serve all of the

&

Before pronouncing sentence, the district court listened to Hernandez's
attorney's comments and Hernandez's allocution. (Tr., p. 550, L. 21 - 562, L. 17.) It
reviewed the pre-sentence investigative report, including the numerous attachments
and letters. (Tr., p. 572, Ls. 6-12.)
The district court discussed Hernandez's failure to take responsibility for his
actions and his belief that Ms. Zuniga needed to be punished as well: 2
The other thing I noticed in his version of the crime, and I will quote
from his version. "And I accept their verdict. They said - they said on
guilt" - I think it's supposed to be, I'm guilty. "But I think if I'm guilty, she
should be punished, too, because she led me to believe that she wanted
that she needs
punishment. And to me that's very, very concerning.
(Tr., p. 571, Ls. 1-10.) The district court also noted the inconsistencies in Hernandez's
statements - that although at sentencing Hernandez claimed that the sex was

2

On appeal, Hernandez continues to assert that the sexual contact with Ms. Zuniga
was consensual. However, he purports to "accept[] the jury's verdict of guilty and its
consequences." (Appellant's brief, p. 13.)
14

consensual, when he was first confronted about the rape, he denied any sexual contact.
(Tr., p. 568, L. 17 - p. 569, L. 3.)
The district court focused on Hernandez's reaction to Ms. Zuniga's testimony at
trial:
I noticed a couple of things when Miss Zuniga was testifying about
the rape itself. Mr. Hernandez actually got a smile on his face. He looked
satisfied. And there was one point where he got - then he noticed - I
wrote this down, because all of a sudden he realized I was watching him
and his demeanor changed.
But when she testified about the attempt to anally penetrate her,
the vaginal penetration, the hickey on her neck, he got, like I said, a smile
on his face, which to me is very odd. I don't know why somebody would
think that was something to smile about.
But here's the thing that really affected me. When she testified that
he had said to her let - and I think her boyfriend's name is Herminia or
something like that - know how it feels to have his girlfriend "F'ed" by
another man, he got the biggest smile that I have ever seen.
(Tr., p. 564, L. 22 - p. 565, L. 16.) The court explained that this showed that "it wasn't
just Miss Zuniga who was involved in the crime. It was also the fact that the man with
whom she was having sexual relations while still married to Mr. Hernandez, that this
was also about his attack on that man." (Tr., p. 565, L. 22 - p. 566, L. 4.) It concluded,
"It was really about violence against the victim and against the man who had succeeded
L:_ "
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Contrary to Hernandez's contentions on appeal (Appellant's brief, pp. 13-14 ), the
district court noted that Hernandez was, in most situations, a law-abiding citizen. (Tr.,
pp. 566, Ls. 9-13.) It also noted that Hernandez loved his children and had "stepped up
to the plate," which showed his "strong character." (Tr., p. 566, Ls. 13-21.) The district
court explained, "I have taken that into account.
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He assumed a role that very few

people are willing to assume.

Very few people are willing to put aside their own

aspirations in order to help their family.... That tells me a lot about him as a person."
(Tr., p. 566, L. 22 - p. 567, L. 3.)
However, the dlstrict court also discussed a jail report in which Hernandez was
taunting and "threatening to take care of [another] inmate" and how that report was
consistent with what the district court had observed in court and with Ms. Zuniga's
claims. (Tr., p. 570. L. 5 - p. 572, L. 5.) It explained that those actions show the "real
Mr. Hernandez." (Tr., p. 570, Ls. 24-25.)
Finally, the district court discussed protection of the community and specifically
discussed protection of Ms. Zuniga. It explained that it was concerned that Ms. Zuniga
would be in "immediate danger" if Hernandez were released into the community and for
that reason wanted Hernandez evaluated on a retained jurisdiction. (Tr., p. 571, Ls. 1125.)
After considering the facts of the case and applying the objectives of criminal
punishment, the court reasonably determined that imposing a unified sentence of 10
years with two years fixed on Hernandez was appropriate given his failure to accept
responsibility for his actions, the violent nature of the crime, and the court's concern for
community safety.

Hernandez argues that the district court abused its discretion.

However, under any reasonable view of the facts, Hernandez has failed to establish an
abuse of discretion.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Victor Luis Hernandez's
conviction and sentence.
DATED this 8th day of August, 2011.
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